A momentum-based approach to learning nash equilibria

  • Authors:
  • Huaxiang Zhang;Peide Liu

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Computer Science, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, Shandong, China;Dept. of Computer Science, Shandong Economics University, Jinan, Shandong, China

  • Venue:
  • PRIMA'06 Proceedings of the 9th Pacific Rim international conference on Agent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Learning a Nash equilibrium of a game is challengeable, and the issue of learning all the Nash equilibria seems intractable. This paper investigates the effectiveness of a momentum-based approach to learning the Nash equilibria of a game. Experimental results show the proposed algorithm can learn a Nash equilibrium in each learning iteration for a normal form strategic game. By employing a deflection technique, it can learn almost all the existing Nash equilibria of a game.