On Schnorr's preprocessing for digital signature schemes

  • Authors:
  • Peter de Rooij

  • Affiliations:
  • PTT Research, Leidschendam, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 1994

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Abstract

Schnorr's preprocessing algorithms [6, 7] are designed to speed up the 'random' exponentiation often performed by the prover/signer in identification and signature schemes.In this paper, an attack on these preprocessing algorithms is presented. For the proposed parameters, the attack requires about 231 steps, and 700 identifications or signatures to retrieve the secret key. Here the underlying scheme may be Schnorr, Brickell-McCurley, ElGamal or DSS.