Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Simulation-Based Security with Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machines
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS
ProvSec '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Provable Security
Cryptographically sound security proofs for basic and public-key kerberos
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Computationally secure two-round authenticated message exchange
ASIACCS '10 Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Simulation-based security notions for cryptographic protocols are regarded as highly desirable, primarily because they admit strong composability and, consequently, a modular design. In this paper, we give a simulation-based security definition for two-round authenticated message exchange and show that a concrete protocol, 2AMEX-1, satisfies our security property, that is, we provide an ideal functionality for two-round authenticated message exchange and show that 2AMEX-1 realizes it securely. To model the involved public-key infrastructure adequately, we use a joint-state approach.