Privacy amplification by public discussion
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Pseudo-random generation from one-way functions
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function
SIAM Journal on Computing
Hard-core distributions for somewhat hard problems
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Key agreement from weak bit agreement
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Deterministic extractors for small-space sources
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo random bits
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Security Amplification for Interactive Cryptographic Primitives
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Computational Indistinguishability Amplification: Tight Product Theorems for System Composition
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Indistinguishability amplification
CRYPTO'07 Proceedings of the 27th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
On the power of the randomized iterate
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Pseudorandom generators from one-way functions: a simple construction for any hardness
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Counterexamples to hardness amplification beyond negligible
TCC'12 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
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It is well known that two random variables X and Y with the same range can be viewed as being equal (in a well-defined sense) with probability 1−d(X,Y), where d(X,Y) is their statistical distance, which in turn is equal to the best distinguishing advantage for X and Y. In other words, if the best distinguishing advantage for X and Y is ε, then with probability 1−ε they are completely indistinguishable. This statement, which can be seen as an information-theoretic version of a hardcore lemma, is for example very useful for proving indistinguishability amplification results. In this paper we prove the computational version of such a hardcore lemma, thereby extending the concept of hardcore sets from the context of computational hardness to the context of computational indistinguishability. This paradigm promises to have many applications in cryptography and complexity theory. It is proven both in a non-uniform and a uniform setting. For example, for a weak pseudorandom generator (PRG) for which the (computational) distinguishing advantage is known to be bounded by ε (e.g. $\epsilon=\frac{1}{2}$), one can define an event on the seed of the PRG which has probability at least 1−ε and such that, conditioned on the event, the output of the PRG is essentially indistinguishable from a string with almost maximal min-entropy, namely log(1/(1−ε)) less than its length. As an application, we show an optimally efficient construction for converting a weak PRG for any ε