A CSP formulation of non-interference and unwinding
Cipher: IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee Newsletter on Security & Privacy
Proving security protocols with model checkers by data independence techniques
Journal of Computer Security
Process algebra and non-interference
Journal of Computer Security
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
Comparing Two Information Flow Security Properties
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
What is Intransitive Noninterference?
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Using data-independence in the analysis of intrusion detection systems
Theoretical Computer Science - Theoretical foundations of security analysis and design II
Robust composition: towards a unified approach to access control and concurrency control
Robust composition: towards a unified approach to access control and concurrency control
Verified Protection Model of the seL4 Microkernel
VSTTE '08 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Verified Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments
Architectural Refinement and Notions of Intransitive Noninterference
ESSoS '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Engineering Secure Software and Systems
ITP'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Interactive theorem proving
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider the problem of detecting covert channels within security-enforcing object-capability patterns. Traditional formalisms for reasoning about the security properties of object-capability patterns require one to be aware, a priori, of all possible mechanisms for covert information flow that might be present within a pattern, in order to detect covert channels within it. We show how the CSP process algebra, and its model-checker FDR, can be applied to overcome this limitation.