Fuzzy nash-pareto equilibrium: concepts and evolutionary detection

  • Authors:
  • Dumitru Dumitrescu;Rodica Ioana Lung;Tudor Dan Mihoc;Reka Nagy

  • Affiliations:
  • Babeş Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania;Babeş Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania;Babeş Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania;Babeş Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca, Romania

  • Venue:
  • EvoApplicatons'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Applications of Evolutionary Computation - Volume Part I
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Standard game theory relies on the assumption that players are rational agents that try to maximize their payoff. Experiments with human players indicate that Nash equilibrium is seldom played. The goal of proposed approach is to explore more nuance equilibria by allowing a player to be biased towards different equilibria in a fuzzy manner. Several classes of equilibria (Nash, Pareto, Nash-Pareto) are defined by using appropriate generative relations. An evolutionary technique for detecting fuzzy equilibria is considered. Experimental results on Cournot’ duopoly game illustrate evolutionary detection of proposed fuzzy equilibria.