Counting stable strategies in random evolutionary games

Authors:
Spyros Kontogiannis;Paul Spirakis
Affiliations:
,Computer Science Department, University of Ioannina, Ioannina, Greece;Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Rio-Patra, Greece
Venue:
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Year:
2005

Citing 2
Cited 1

Worst-case equilibria

STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Approximating the maximum weight clique using replicator dynamics

IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks

On the support size of stable strategies in random games

SAGA'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Stochastic Algorithms: foundations and applications

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper we study the notion of the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) in evolutionary games and we demonstrate their qualitative difference from the Nash Equilibria, by showing that a random evolutionary game has on average exponentially less number of ESS than the number of Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric 2-person game with random payoffs.