Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish routing with atomic players
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The “Price of Anarchy” Under Nonlinear and Asymmetric Costs
Mathematics of Operations Research
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks
Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
The price of anarchy in games of incomplete information
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Smooth inequalities and equilibrium inefficiency in scheduling games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Coevolutionary opinion formation games
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composable and efficient mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We resolve the worst-case price of anarchy (POA) of atomic splittable congestion games. Prior to this work, no tight bounds on the POA in such games were known, even for the simplest non-trivial special case of affine cost functions. We make two distinct contributions. On the upper-bound side, we define the framework of "local smoothness", which refines the standard smoothness framework for games with convex strategy sets. While standard smoothness arguments cannot establish tight bounds on the POA in atomic splittable congestion games, we prove that local smoothness arguments can. Further, we prove that every POA bound derived via local smoothness applies automatically to every correlated equilibrium of the game. Unlike standard smoothness arguments, bounds proved using local smoothness do not always apply to the coarse correlated equilibria of the game. Our second contribution is a very general lower bound: for every set L that satisfies mild technical conditions, the worst-case POA of pure Nash equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games with cost functions in L is exactly the smallest upper bound provable using local smoothness arguments. In particular, the worst-case POA of pure Nash equilibria, mixed Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria coincide in such games.