Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
OSPF: Anatomy of an Internet Routing Protocol
OSPF: Anatomy of an Internet Routing Protocol
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet
A pseudonymous communications infrastructure for the internet
Cover story: they know where you are
IEEE Spectrum
Enlisting ISPs to Improve Online Privacy: IP Address Mixing by Default
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A survey on privacy problems and solutions for VANET based on network model
ICA3PP'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Algorithms and architectures for parallel processing - Volume Part II
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There is a growing concern with preventing unauthorized agents from discovering the geographical location of Internet users, a kind of security called location privacy. The typical deployments of IPv6 in mobile networks allow a correspondent host and any passive eavesdroppers to infer the user's rough geographical location from the IPv6 address. We present a scheme called Cryptographically Protected Prefixes (CPP), to address this problem at the level of IPv6 addressing and forwarding. CPP randomizes the address space of a defined topological region (privacy domain), thereby making it infeasible to infer location information from an IP address. CPP can be deployed incrementally. We present an adversary model and show that CPP is secure within the model. We have implemented CPP as a pre-processing step within the forwarding algorithm in the FreeBSD 4.8 kernel. Our performance testing indicates that CPP pre-processing results in a 40–50 percent overhead for packet forwarding in privacy domain routers. The additional end to end per packet delay is roughly 20 to 60 microseconds.