Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks

Authors:
Mingmei Li;Eiji Kamioka;Shigeki Yamada;Yang Cui
Affiliations:
National Institute of Informatics, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, Japan;National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan;National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan;Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Venue:
ICCNMC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Networking and Mobile Computing
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique “cost and compensation” scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node–Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.