CCured: type-safe retrofitting of legacy code
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
PointguardTM: protecting pointers from buffer overflow vulnerabilities
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
StackGuard: automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
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We present a new efficient pointer protection method to defend buffer overflow attacks. It uses a simple watermark to protect the pointer: during dereferencing the pointer variable, a watermark is also written/updated and before referencing the pointer variable, it verifies consistency of the watermark. If the pointer's watermark does not exist or was damaged, our scheme regards this as an intrusion and stops the execution. The proposed scheme has the following strong points. First, unlike other randomization methods, our scheme has no possibility of malfunction caused by the execution of arbitrary instructions. Second, we conducted various experiments on prototype implementation, which showed that our scheme is as secure as the previous randomization schemes. Third, experimental results showed that the performance degradation is not high. Forth, unlike other randomization schemes, our scheme can support attack profiling.