A fast correlation attack on the shrinking generator

  • Authors:
  • Bin Zhang;Hongjun Wu;Dengguo Feng;Feng Bao

  • Affiliations:
  • ,Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore;Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore;State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P. R. China;Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

In this paper we demonstrate a fast correlation attack on the shrinking generator with known connections. Our attack is applicable to arbitrary weight feedback polynomial of the generating LFSR and comparisons with other known attacks show that our attack offers good trade-offs between required keystream length, success probability and complexity. Our result confirms Golić's conjecture that the shrinking generator may be vulnerable to fast correlation attacks without exhaustively searching through all possible initial states of some LFSR is correct.