Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Comparing information without leaking it
Communications of the ACM
Password Authentication Using Multiple Servers
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Threshold Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proving Without Knowing: On Oblivious, Agnostic and Blindolded Provers
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Server-Assisted Generation of a Strong Secret from a Password
WETICE '00 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Mix and Match: Secure Function Evaluation via Ciphertexts
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Two-server password-only authenticated key exchange
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Two-Server password-only authenticated key exchange
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Practical yet universally composable two-server password-authenticated secret sharing
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Traditional password-based authentication and key-ex-change protocols suffer from the simple fact that a single server stores the sensitive user password. In practice, when such a server is compromised, a large number of user passwords, (usually password hashes) are exposed at once. A natural solution involves splitting password between two or more servers. This work formally models the basic security requirement for two-server password authentication protocols, and in this framework provides concrete security proofs for two protocols. The first protocol considered [7] appeared at USENIX'03, but contained no security proof. For this protocol, we provide a concrete reduction to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model. Next we present a second protocol, based on the same hard problem, but which is simpler, and has an easier, tighter reduction proof.