The computational complexity of universal hashing
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Hyper-Encryption and Everlasting Security
STACS '02 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
UMAC: Fast and Secure Message Authentication
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Hyper-encryption against Space-Bounded Adversaries from On-Line Strong Extractors
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
LFSR-based Hashing and Authentication
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Bucket Hashing and its Application to Fast Message Authentication
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
MMH: Software Message Authentication in the Gbit/Second Rates
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
Everlasting security in the bounded storage model
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Proposed by Maurer the bounded storage model has received much academic attention in the recent years. Perhaps the main reason for this attention is that the model facilitates a unique private key encryption scheme called hyper-encryption which provides everlasting unconditional security. So far the work on the bounded storage model has been largely on the theoretical basis. In this paper, we make a first attempt to outline a secure communication protocol based on this model. We describe a protocol which defines means for successfully establishing and carrying out an encryption session and address potential problems such as protocol failures and attacks. Furthermore, we outline a novel method for authenticating and ensuring the integrity of a channel against errors.