A mutual influence algorithm for multiple concurrent negotiations – a game theoretical analysis

  • Authors:
  • Ka-man Lam;Ho-fung Leung

  • Affiliations:
  • Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

  • Venue:
  • KES'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems - Volume Part II
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Buyers always want to obtain goods at the lowest price. To achieve this, a buyer agent can have multiple concurrent negotiations with all the sellers. It is obvious that when the buyer obtains a new low offer from one of the sellers during negotiation, the buyer should have more bargaining power in negotiating with other sellers, as other sellers should offer a even lower price in order to make a deal. In this way, the concurrent negotiations mutually influence one another. In this paper, we present an algorithm to enable mutual influence among multiple concurrent negotiations. We show that the outcome of this algorithm is in Nash equilibrium when we model and analyze the negotiation as a game.