Finding covert channels in protocols with message sequence charts: the case of RMTP2

Authors:
Loic Hélouët
Affiliations:
IRISA, Rennes, France
Venue:
SAM'04 Proceedings of the 4th international SDL and MSC conference on System Analysis and Modeling
Year:
2004

Citing 6
Cited 0

An Axiomatic Approach to Information Flow in Programs

ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Shared resource matrix methodology: an approach to identifying storage and timing channels

ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A note on the confinement problem

Communications of the ACM
Eliminating Covert Flows with Minimum Typings

CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A comment on the confinement problem

SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Language-based information-flow security

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Covert channels are illegal information flows in systems. Recent research has shown how to detect covert channels in scenario descriptions. This paper recalls these results, and proposes a case study illustrating how scenarios can be used to detect illegal information flows from a scenario description of a protocol. Once a covert information flow is discovered, its bandwidth is computed using the (max, +) algebra.