On power-law relationships of the Internet topology
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Proceedings of the 9th international World Wide Web conference on Computer networks : the international journal of computer and telecommunications netowrking
IEEE Internet Computing
Evolution and Structure of the Internet: A Statistical Physics Approach
Evolution and Structure of the Internet: A Statistical Physics Approach
Evolution of Networks: From Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW (Physics)
Evolution of Networks: From Biological Nets to the Internet and WWW (Physics)
A critical point for random graphs with a given degree sequence
Random Structures & Algorithms
Theoretical Computer Science - Complex networks
Describing and simulating internet routes
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Analysis of graphs for digital preservation suitability
Proceedings of the 21st ACM conference on Hypertext and hypermedia
Assessing the vulnerability of replicated network services
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
Network topology reconfiguration against targeted and random attack
IWSOS'07 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Self-Organizing Systems
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It appeared recently that some statistical properties of complex networks like the Internet, the World Wide Web or Peer-to-Peer systems have an important influence on their resilience to failures and attacks. In particular, scale-free networks (i.e. networks with power-law degree distribution) seem much more robust than random networks in case of failures, while they are more sensitive to attacks. In this paper we deepen the study of the differences in the behavior of these two kinds of networks when facing failures or attacks. We moderate the general affirmation that scale-free networks are much more sensitive than random networks to attacks by showing that the number of links to remove in both cases is similar, and by showing that a slightly modified scenario for failures gives results similar to the ones for attacks. We also propose and analyze an efficient attack strategy against links.