Agent-Based evolutionary labor market model with strategic coalition

Authors:
Seung-Ryong Yang;Jun-Ki Min;Sung-Bae Cho
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea;Department of Computer Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea;Department of Computer Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea
Venue:
AI'04 Proceedings of the 17th Australian joint conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2004

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Abstract

A real-world labor market has complex worksite interactions between a worker and an employer This paper investigates the behavior patterns of workers and employers with a job capacity and a job concentration empirically considering a strategic coalition in an agent-based computational labor market Here, the strategic coalition can be formed autonomously among workers and/or among employers For each experimental treatment, the behavior patterns of agents are varied with a job capacity and a job concentration depending on whether a coalition is allowed Experimental results show that a strategic coalition makes workers and employers aggressive in worksite interactions against their partners.