Stochastic game net and applications in security analysis for enterprise network

  • Authors:
  • Yuanzhuo Wang;Min Yu;Jingyuan Li;Kun Meng;Chuang Lin;Xueqi Cheng

  • Affiliations:
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Computing Technology, 100190, Beijing, China;University of Science and Technology, Information Engineering School, 100083, Beijing, China;Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Computing Technology, 100190, Beijing, China;Tsinghua University, Department of Computer Science and Technology, 100084, Beijing, China;Tsinghua University, Department of Computer Science and Technology, 100084, Beijing, China;Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Computing Technology, 100190, Beijing, China

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Information Security
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Stochastic game theoretic framework has been used in many fields of networks with interactive behaviors. However, further use of this framework is limited due to the following reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to build comprehensive and rigorous models for complex network structures by the state-based game model. Secondly, solving and extending the dynamic behaviors of participators of the network are nearly impossible, because of the complexity of state transitions. Last but not least, general game model is not able to describe and analyze specific events and behaviors in some kinds of networks, like enterprise networks. In this paper, we propose a new modeling paradigm (stochastic game net, or SGN) for stochastic games representation with Petri nets. Based on our graphical tool, stochastic game problems can be described clearly, and the model can be solved and extended easily. Moreover, this paper puts forth a series of methods for modeling and analyzing the competitive game by SGN, which is the main contribution of this work. Our achievements are applied to the security analysis for enterprise networks. The analysis results prove the powerful ability of our achievements in solving the complicated and dynamic game problems. Furthermore, our approaches can be used to calculate the existence and the value of an equilibrium point.