CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
Convex Optimization
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Analysis of iterative waterfilling algorithm for multiuser power control in digital subscriber lines
EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing
The MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Power allocation games for MIMO multiple access channels with coordination
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Resource allocation games in interference relay channels
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Resource allocation in protected and shared bands: uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibria
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
On the base station selection and base station sharing in self-configuring networks
Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Iterative water-filling for Gaussian vector multiple-access channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Asynchronous Iterative Water-Filling for Gaussian Frequency-Selective Interference Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Competitive Design of Multiuser MIMO Systems Based on Game Theory: A Unified View
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We analyze the distributed power allocation problem in parallel multiple access channels (MAC) by studying an associated non-cooperative game which admits an exact potential function. Even though games of this type have been the subject of considerable study in the literature [1--4], we find that the sufficient conditions which ensure uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points typically do not hold in this context. Nonetheless, we show that the parallel MAC game admits a unique equilibrium almost surely, thus establishing an important class of counterexamples where these sufficient conditions are not necessary. Furthermore, if the network's users employ a distributed learning scheme based on the replicator dynamics, we show that they converge to equilibrium from almost any initial condition, even though users only have local information at their disposal.