Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Fundamentals of wireless communication
Fundamentals of wireless communication
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Repeated open spectrum sharing game with cheat-proof strategies
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Nash equilibrium design and optimization
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Impact of interference coupling - loss of convexity
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Energy-aware utility regions: multiple access Pareto boundary
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Concave and Convex Interference Functions—General Characterizations and Applications
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing - Part I
Multiaccess fading channels. II. Delay-limited capacities
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the duality of Gaussian multiple-access and broadcast channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Distributed interference compensation for wireless networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper, we address the problem of power allocation in multiple access (MAC) and broadcast channels (BC) with linear pricing framework to ensure that each user in the interference network can achieve its utility requirement. In the framework the system optimizer maximizes the system utility with the pricing function. The existence of the universal linear pricing mechanism is characterized. Algorithms for solving the linear pricing problems in MAC and BC are proposed. The sufficient condition for linear pricing in MAC with successive interference cancelation (SIC) and its best decoding order are analyzed. The relation between the order of channel states, the optimal weights and prices, and the resulting cost is characterized. Moreover, we show that it is possible for users to cheat in their channel states in order to achieve better rates. Finally, we argue that there cannot be an incentive compatible mechanism design for this universal linear pricing scheme.