Planning for PKI: Best Practices Guide for Deploying Public Key Infrastructure
Planning for PKI: Best Practices Guide for Deploying Public Key Infrastructure
Authorization and Attribute Certificates for Widely Distributed Access Control
WETICE '98 Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Role-Based Access Control With X.509 Attribute Certificates
IEEE Internet Computing
The PERMIS X.509 role based privilege management infrastructure
Future Generation Computer Systems - Special section: Selected papers from the TERENA networking conference 2002
A Community Authorization Service for Group Collaboration
POLICY '02 Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks (POLICY'02)
Why Johnny can't encrypt: a usability evaluation of PGP 5.0
SSYM'99 Proceedings of the 8th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 8
Supporting Security-Oriented, Collaborative nanoCMOS Electronics Research
ICCS '08 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Computational Science, Part I
Shibboleth-based Access to and Usage of Grid Resources
GRID '06 Proceedings of the 7th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Computing
Fine grained access control with trust and reputation management for globus
OTM'07 Proceedings of the 2007 OTM confederated international conference on On the move to meaningful internet systems: CoopIS, DOA, ODBASE, GADA, and IS - Volume Part II
EuroPKI'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Public Key Infrastructure
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The widespread acceptance and uptake of Grid technology can only be achieved if it can be ensured that the security mechanisms needed to support Grid based collaborations are at least as strong as local security mechanisms. The predominant way in which security is currently addressed in the Grid community is through Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) to support authentication. Whilst PKIs address user identity issues, authentication does not provide fine grained control over what users are allowed to do on remote resources (authorisation). The Grid community have put forward numerous software proposals for authorisation infrastructures such as AKENTI [1], CAS [2], CARDEA [3], GSI [4], PERMIS [5,6,7] and VOMS [8,9]. It is clear that for the foreseeable future a collection of solutions will be the norm. To address this, the Global Grid Forum (GGF) have proposed a generic SAML based authorisation API which in principle should allow for fine grained control for authorised access to any Grid service. Experiences in applying and stress testing this API from a variety of different application domains are essential to give insight into the practical aspects of large scale usage of authorisation infrastructures. This paper presents experiences from the DTI funded BRIDGES project [10] and the JISC funded DyVOSE project [11] in using this API with Globus version 3.3 [12] and the PERMIS authorisation infrastructure.