An ontological approach to the document access problem of insider threat

  • Authors:
  • Boanerges Aleman-Meza;Phillip Burns;Matthew Eavenson;Devanand Palaniswami;Amit Sheth

  • Affiliations:
  • LSDIS Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA;Computer Technology Associates, Colorado Springs, CO;LSDIS Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA;LSDIS Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA;LSDIS Lab, Department of Computer Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA

  • Venue:
  • ISI'05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE international conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Verification of legitimate access of documents, which is one aspect of the umbrella of problems in the Insider Threat category, is a challenging problem. This paper describes the research and prototyping of a system that takes an ontological approach, and is primarily targeted for use by the intelligence community. Our approach utilizes the notion of semantic associations and their discovery among a collection of heterogeneous documents. We highlight our contributions in (graphically) capturing the scope of the investigation assignment of an intelligence analyst by referring to classes and relationships of an ontology; in computing a measure of the relevance of documents accessed by an analyst with respect to his/her assignment; and by describing the components of our system that have provided early yet promising results, and which will be further evaluated more extensively based on domain experts and sponsor inputs.