Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Some Tractable Combinatorial Auctions
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Vickrey Prices and Shortest Paths: What is an Edge Worth?
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: optimal and approximate approaches
IJCAI'99 Proceedings of the 16th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Exact algorithms for the matrix bid auction
Computers and Operations Research
Exact algorithms for the matrix bid auction
WEA'07 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Experimental algorithms
Algorithms for Recognizing Economic Properties in Matrix Bid Combinatorial Auctions
INFORMS Journal on Computing
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Among all the variations of general combinatorial auctions, the Vickrey auction is essentially the only incentive-compatible auction. Furthermore, it is individual rational and weakly budget-balanced. In many cases these properties are very desirable. However, computing the winners and their payments in a Vickrey auction involves solving several NP-complete problems. While there have been many approaches to solve the winner determination problem via search, this search has not been extended to compute the Vickrey payments. The naive approach is to consecutively solve each problem using the same search algorithm. We present an extension to this procedure to accelerate the computation of Vickrey payments using a simple backtrack algorithm. However, our results can be applied to sophisticated branch-and-bound solvers as well. We test our approach on data evolving from a Lufthansa flight schedule. Data of this type might be of interest, since authentic data for combinatorial auctions is rare and uch sought after. A remarkable result is that after solving the winner determination problem we can provide bounds for the remaining problems that differ from the optimal solution by only 2.2% on average. We as well manage to obtain a rapid speedup by tolerating small deviations from the optimal solutions. In all cases, the actual deviations are much smaller than the allowed deviations.