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Spin model checker, the: primer and reference manual
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Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2007
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Conventional software model-checking involves (i) creating an abstract model of a complex application; (ii) validating this model against the application; and (iii) checking safety properties against the abstract model. To non-experts, steps (i) and (ii) are often the most daunting. Firstly how does one decide which aspects of the application to include in the abstract model? Secondly, how does one determine whether the abstraction inadvertently “hides” critical bugs? Similarly, if a counter-example is found, how does one determine whether this is a genuine bug or just a modelling artifact?