Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology of nuclear missile guidance
Inventing accuracy: a historical sociology of nuclear missile guidance
Safeware: system safety and computers
Safeware: system safety and computers
The art of efficient man-machine interaction: improving the coupling between man and machine
Expertise and technology
Intent Specifications: An Approach to Building Human-Centered Specifications
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Software fundamentals: collected papers by David L. Parnas
Software fundamentals: collected papers by David L. Parnas
Safety Critical Computer Systems
Safety Critical Computer Systems
Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After
A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Maintenance
SAFECOMP '99 Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Computer Computer Safety, Reliability and Security
Large-scale requirements analysis as heterogeneous engineering
Social thinking
RISE'06 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Rapid integration of software engineering techniques
Evolutionary risk analysis: expert judgement
SAFECOMP'11 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Computer safety, reliability, and security
Modeling safety case evolution – examples from the air traffic management domain
RISE'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Rapid Integration of Software Engineering Techniques
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In order realistically and cost-effectively to realize the ATM (Air Traffic Management) 2000+ Strategy, systems from different suppliers will be interconnected to form a complete functional and operational environment, covering ground segments and aerospace. Industry will be involved as early as possible in the lifecycle of ATM projects. EUROCONTROL manages the processes that involve the definition and validation of new ATM solutions using Industry capabilities (e.g., SMEs). In practice, safety analyses adapt and reuse system design models (produced by third parties). Technical, organisational and cost-related reasons often determine this choice, although design models are unfit for safety analysis. Design models provide limited support to safety analysis, because they are tailored for system designers. The definition of an adequate model and of an underlying methodology for its construction will be highly beneficial for whom is performing safety analyses. Limited budgets and resources, often, constrain or inhibit the model definition phase as an integral part of safety analysis. This paper is concerned with problems in modeling ATM systems for safety analysis. The main objective is to highlight a model specifically targeted to support evolutionary safety analysis.