An efficient probabilistic public key encryption scheme which hides all partial information
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Authentication in distributed systems: theory and practice
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
The consensus problem in fault-tolerant computing
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Communications of the ACM
Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
The Open-End Argument for Private Computing
HUC '99 Proceedings of the 1st international symposium on Handheld and Ubiquitous Computing
A taxonomy of DDoS attack and DDoS defense mechanisms
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Computer Security in the Real World
Computer
Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Credentials and Beliefs in Remote Trusted Platforms Attestation
WOWMOM '06 Proceedings of the 2006 International Symposium on on World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
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When the safety community designs their systems to also maintain security properties, it is likely that public-key encryption will be among the tools that are applied. The security guarantees of this technology are based on a particular model of computation. We present the properties of this model that are relevant in the setting of distributed systems. Of particular importance is that the model has no notion of time. From this it follows that systems that need to be available must exercise the utmost care before applying public-key encryption in any form. We discuss the relation between public-key encryption and timeliness, the tradeoffs that must be made at design time, and how the property of (lack of) availability might very well contaminate other system components.