Authentication in distributed systems: theory and practice
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A logic for reasoning about security
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A calculus for access control in distributed systems
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Introduction to HOL: a theorem proving environment for higher order logic
Introduction to HOL: a theorem proving environment for higher order logic
A role-based access control model and reference implementation within a corporate intranet
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special issue on role-based access control
The ARBAC97 model for role-based administration of roles
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) - Special issue on role-based access control
Proposed NIST standard for role-based access control
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A Modal Logical Framework for Security Policies
ISMIS '97 Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Foundations of Intelligent Systems
Administrative scope: A foundation for role-based administrative models
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A Formal Semantics for SPKI
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Making correct access-control decisions is central to security, which in turn requires accounting correctly for the identity, credentials, roles, authority, and privileges of users and their agents. In networked systems, these decisions are made more complex because of delegation and differing access-control policies. Methods for reasoning rigorously about access control and computer-assisted reasoning tools for verification are effective for providing assurances of security. In this paper we extend the access-control logic of [11,1] to also support reasoning about role-based access control (RBAC), which is a popular technique for reducing the complexity of assigning privileges to users. The result is an access-control logic which is simple enough for design and verification engineers to use to assure the correctness of systems with access-control requirements but yet powerful enough to reason about delegations, credentials, and trusted authorities. We explain how to describe RBAC components such as user assignments, permission assignments, role inheritance, role activations, and users' requests. The logic and its extensions are proved to be sound and implemented in the HOL (Higher Order Logic version 4) theorem prover. We also provide formal support for RBAC's static separation of duty and dynamic separation of duty constraints in the HOL theorem prover. As a result, HOL can be used to verify properties of RBAC access-control policies, credentials, authority, and delegations.