ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Automata, Languages, and Machines
Automata, Languages, and Machines
Formal Semantics for Authentication Logics
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
FME '01 Proceedings of the International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Formal Methods for Increasing Software Productivity
Possibilistic Definitions of Security - An Assembly Kit
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Confidentiality-Preserving Refinement
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Preserving Information Flow Properties under Refinement
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On a formal framework for security properties
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Secure Web Service Workflow Execution
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Security rules versus security properties
ICISS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information systems security
Enforcing S&D pattern design in RCES with modeling and formal approaches
Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Model driven engineering languages and systems
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Confidentiality of certain parameters is an essential security requirement for many security sensitive applications. In this paper, conditions for abstractions are formulated in terms of formal language theory to be able to prove parameter confidentiality in an abstract view of a system and then conclude that an adequate representation of the property is satisfied in the refined system as well. These conditions essentially depend on an agent's view as well as on an agent's initial knowledge of the system behaviour, which explicitely formalizes assumptions about the system.