Detection, Estimation, and Modulation Theory: Radar-Sonar Signal Processing and Gaussian Signals in Noise
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference
Design automation of real-life asynchronous devices and systems
Foundations and Trends in Electronic Design Automation
An overview of side channel analysis attacks
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Information Theoretic Evaluation of Side-Channel Resistant Logic Styles
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Characterization of the electromagnetic side channel in frequency domain
Inscrypt'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Implementing cryptography on TFT technology for secure display applications
CARDIS'06 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Automated design of cryptographic devices resistant to multiple side-channel attacks
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Evaluation metrics of physical non-invasive security
WISTP'10 Proceedings of the 4th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information Security Theory and Practices: security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices
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Electromagnetic analysis (EMA) can be used to compromise secret information by analysing the electric and/or magnetic fields emanating from a device. It follows differential power analysis (DPA) becoming an important side channel cryptanalysis attack on many cryptographic implementations, so that constitutes a real threat to smart card security. A systematic simulation methodology is proposed to identify and assess electromagnetic (EM) leakage characteristics of secure processors at design time. This EM simulation methodology involves current flow simulation, chip layout parasitics extraction, then data processing to simulate direct EM emissions or modulated emissions. Tests implemented on synchronous and asynchronous processors indicates that the synchronous processor has data dependent EM emission, while the asynchronous processor has data dependent timing which is visible in differential EM analysis (DEMA). In particular, DEMA of amplitude demodulated emissions reveals greater leakage compared to DEMA of direct emissions and DPA. The proposed simulation methodology can be easily employed in the framework of an integrated circuit (IC) design flow to perform a systematic EM characteristics analysis.