Optical Fault Induction Attacks
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Data remanence in semiconductor devices
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Secure deletion of data from magnetic and solid-state memory
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
Recovering data from USB flash memory sticks that have been damaged or electronically erased
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Forensic applications and techniques in telecommunications, information, and multimedia and workshop
Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption Based on Physically Unclonable Functions
ASIACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Keeping data secret under full compromise using porter devices
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
An efficient checkpoint scheme for the fast mount of flash file system
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Research in Applied Computation
A fast mount mechanism for YAFFS2
Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Empirical analysis of solid state disk data retention when used with contemporary operating systems
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip
CHES'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A comprehensive black-box methodology for testing the forensic characteristics of solid-state drives
Proceedings of the 29th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
FROST: forensic recovery of scrambled telephones
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Data remanence is the residual physical representation of data that has been erased or overwritten. In non-volatile programmable devices, such as UV EPROM, EEPROM or Flash, bits are stored as charge in the floating gate of a transistor. After each erase operation, some of this charge remains. Security protection in microcontrollers and smartcards with EEPROM/Flash memories is based on the assumption that information from the memory disappears completely after erasing. While microcontroller manufacturers successfully hardened already their designs against a range of attacks, they still have a common problem with data remanence in floating-gate transistors. Even after an erase operation, the transistor does not return fully to its initial state, thereby allowing the attacker to distinguish between previously programmed and not programmed transistors, and thus restore information from erased memory. The research in this direction is summarised here and it is shown how much information can be extracted from some microcontrollers after their memory has been ‘erased'.