Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Load balancing in the L/sub p/ norm
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish routing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Load balancing and locality in range-queriable data structures
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Fairness and optimality in congestion games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Routing games with an unknown set of active players
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Priority based load balancing in a self-interested P2P network
DBISP2P'05/06 Proceedings of the 2005/2006 international conference on Databases, information systems, and peer-to-peer computing
Faster algorithms for semi-matching problems
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Convergence and approximation in potential games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Convergence and approximation in potential games
Theoretical Computer Science
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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In P2P systems, users often have many choices of peers from whom to download their data. Each user cares primarily about its own response time, which depends on how many other users also choose that same peer. This interaction is best modeled as a game among self-interested agents, which we call uncoordinated load balancing. The players in this game are the rational and strategic users who are free to act in their own self-interest. We describe some of our recent work on this problem, and propose several new research directions, including analyzing Nash equilibria under general latency functions, a cost to switch servers, settings where user groups are dynamic, as well as the complexity of finding Nash solutions, and incentives for peers to be truthful in revealing their load.