Optimistic protocols for fair exchange
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Certified email with a light on-line trusted third party: design and implementation
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
Stateless-Recipient Certified E-Mail System Based on Verifiable Encryption
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Selective Receipt in Certified E-mail
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
A Certified E-mail System with Receiver's Selective Usage of Delivery Authority
INDOCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Cryptology: Progress in Cryptology
Exploring Fair Exchange Protocols Using Specification Animation
ISW '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Security
An Efficient Protocol for Certified Electronic Mail
ISW '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Information Security
An Attack on a Protocol for Certified Delivery
ISC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Security
Simple and fast optimistic protocols for fair electronic exchange
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols
Computer Communications
Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Generic non-repudiation protocols supporting transparent off-line TTP
Journal of Computer Security - On IWAP'05
Efficient and secure protocol in fair certified E-mail delivery
WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications
Some common attacks against certified email protocols and the countermeasures
Computer Communications
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As a value-added service for standard e-mail systems, a certified e-mail scheme allows a sender to deliver a message to a receiver in a fair way in the sense that either the sender obtains a receipt from the receiver and the receiver accesses the content of the e-mail simultaneously, or neither party gets the expected item. In 2000, Ferrer-Gomila et al. [11] proposed a novel certified e-mail protocol. Their scheme is both efficient and optimistic, since it has only three steps and a trusted third party is not involved in normal cases. Later, Monteiro and Dahab [16] identified an attack on Ferrer-Gomila et al.’s scheme, and further presented a modified scheme. In this paper, we show that their improvement is still insecure by successfully identifying several weaknesses and security flaws. Our attacks also apply to Ferrer-Gomila et al.’s original scheme.