Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Integration of Asymmetric and Symmetric Encryption Schemes
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Key-Insulated Public Key Cryptosystems
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Applications of Multiple Trust Authorities in Pairing Based Cryptosystems
InfraSec '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on Infrastructure Security
Can We Eliminate Certificate Revocations Lists?
FC '98 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Strong Key-Insulated Signature Schemes
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Certificate revocation and certificate update
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Certificate-based encryption and the certificate revocation problem
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Access control using pairing based cryptography
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
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The popular certificate revocation systems such as CRL and OCSP have a common drawback that they are explicit certificate revocation; the sender must obtain the revocation status information of the receiver’s certificate, before sending an encrypted message. Recently, an implicit certificate revocation system called ‘certificate-based encryption’ was introduced. In this model, a receiver needs both his private key and an up-to-date certificate from the CA (Certification Authority) to decrypt a ciphertext, while senders need not be concerned about the certificate revocation problem. Hence, the certificate-based encryption system has the advantage of light infrastructure requirement. However, the certificate-based encryption system has an important drawback that it is inseparable; only the CA can handle the certificate revocation problem and the load cannot be distributed among multiple trusted authorities. In this paper, we propose a separable implicit certificate revocation system called ‘status certificate-based encryption,’ in which the authenticity of a public key is guaranteed by a (long-lived) certificate and the certificate revocation problem is resolved by a (short-lived) status certificate. We present a secure construction based on bilinear mappings as well as definitional works.