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This paper describes a communications networking technique for funds transfer which combines the privacy of cash transactions with the security, record-keeping and charging mechanisms of credit cards. The scheme uses a communications network and cryptographic protocols to separate information. The company that extends credit to the individual and collects the bill does not have access to the specific purchases, and the shop that sells the merchandise is convinced that it will be paid without learning the individual's identity.The information is separated to make it difficult to associate an individual with his purchases. Analysis of the information separation in this system shows that five parties must collude to associate an individual's identity and purchases. If an individual deposits cash into the system, rather than asking for credit, then none of the parties need to know his identity. Complete anonymity is obtained while retaining the security against loss or theft and the record keeping capabilities of credit cards.