The design of substitution-permutation networks resistant to differential and linear cryptanalysis

  • Authors:
  • H. M. Heys;S. E. Tavares

  • Affiliations:
  • Electrical Engineering, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

  • Venue:
  • CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 1994

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Abstract

In this paper we examine a class of product ciphers referred to as substitution-permutation networks. We investigate the resistance of these cryptographic networks to two important attacks: differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In particular, we develop upper bounds on the differential characteristic probability and on the probability of a linear approximation as a function of the number of rounds of substitutions. Further, it is shown that using large S-boxes with good diffusion characteristics and replacing the permutation between rounds by an appropriate linear transformation is effective in improving the cipher security in relation to these two attacks.