Voice over IP performance monitoring
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Allowable Propagation Delay for VoIP Calls of Acceptable Quality
AISA '02 Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Advanced Internet Services and Applications
Internet Packet Loss: Measurement and Implications for End-to-End QoS
ICPPW '98 Proceedings of the 1998 International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops
Access for sale: a new class of worm
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
OTM '08 Proceedings of the OTM 2008 Confederated International Conferences, CoopIS, DOA, GADA, IS, and ODBASE 2008. Part II on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems
An empirical evaluation of VoIP playout buffer dimensioning in Skype, Google talk, and MSN Messenger
Proceedings of the 18th international workshop on Network and operating systems support for digital audio and video
IEEE Spectrum
Hopcount and e2e delay: IPv6 versus IPv4
PAM'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement
Delay reduction techniques for playout buffering
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
Adaptive playout scheduling and loss concealment for voice communication over IP networks
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
Lost audio packets steganography: the first practical evaluation
Security and Communication Networks
VoIP steganography and its Detection—A survey
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Voice over IP (VoIP) is unquestionably the most popular real-time service in IP networks today. Recent studies have shown that it is also a suitable carrier for information hiding. Hidden communication may pose security concerns as it can lead to confidential information leakage. In VoIP, RTP (Real-time Transport Protocol) in particular, which provides the means for the successful transport of voice packets through IP networks, is suitable for steganographic purposes. It is characterised by a high packet rate compared to other protocols used in IP telephony, resulting in a potentially high steganographic bandwidth. The modification of an RTP packet stream provides many opportunities for hidden communication as the packets may be delayed, reordered or intentionally lost. In this paper, to enable the detection of steganographic exchanges in VoIP, we examined real RTP traffic traces to answer the questions, what do the "normal" delays in RTP packet streams look like? and, is it possible to detect the use of known RTP steganographic methods based on this knowledge?