A critical point for random graphs with a given degree sequence
Random Graphs 93 Proceedings of the sixth international seminar on Random graphs and probabilistic methods in combinatorics and computer science
A local mean field analysis of security investments in networks
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Efficient control of epidemics over random networks
Proceedings of the eleventh international joint conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World
Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World
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The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination game with binary choice and give a condition for a new action to become widespread in a random network. We also analyze the possible equilibria of this game and identify conditions for the coexistence of both strategies in large connected sets. Finally we look at how can firms use social networks to promote their goals with limited information. Our results differ strongly from the one derived with epidemic models and show that connectivity plays an ambiguous role: while it allows the diffusion to spread, when the network is highly connected, the diffusion is also limited by high-degree nodes which are very stable.