Applications of circumscription to formalizing common-sense knowledge
Artificial Intelligence
Logical foundations of artificial intelligence
Logical foundations of artificial intelligence
A logical framework for default reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible inference
Explanation and prediction: an architecture for default and abductive reasoning
Computational Intelligence
What the lottery paradox tells us about default reasoning
Proceedings of the first international conference on Principles of knowledge representation and reasoning
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on knowledge representation
IJCAI'81 Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A clash of intuitions: the current state of nonmonotonic multiple inheritance systems
IJCAI'87 Proceedings of the 10th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the comparison of theories: preferring the most specific explanation
IJCAI'85 Proceedings of the 9th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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With respect to any inference we might make about an individual having a certain property, Kyburg's theory of epistemological probability requires us to assume that the individual under discussion is randomly drawn from some reference class. The probability that the individual has the property is equal to the proportion of individuals in the reference class having that property. When this proportion, or its lower bound, is sufficiently high, the individual is said to be practically certain to hold the property. The ideas of epistemological randomness and practical certainty address the same inferential problems addressed by the manipulation of abnormality predicates in circumscription and other nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms. This article revisits the goals and problems of nonmonotonic reasoning through the lens of epistemological probability.