Practical Byzantine fault tolerance
OSDI '99 Proceedings of the third symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
Secure and Scalable Replication in Phalanx
SRDS '98 Proceedings of the The 17th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems
Efficient Byzantine-Tolerant Erasure-Coded Storage
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Distributed Computing
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
DISC'07 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Distributed Computing
DISC'07 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Distributed Computing
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The original work on quorum systems assumed that servers fail benignly, by crashing or omitting some steps. More recently, researchers have developed techniques that enable quorum systems to provide data availability in the presence of arbitrary (Byzantine) faults [6]. Earlier work provides correct semantics despite server (i.e., replica) failures and also handles some of the problems of Byzantine clients [1,2,4,6, 9]. This paper describes the first protocols to handle all problems caused by Byzantine clients. Our protocols ensure that bad clients cannot interfere with good clients. Bad clients cannot prevent good clients from completing reads and writes, nor can they cause good clients to see inconsistencies. In addition bad clients that have been removed from operation can leave behind at most a bounded number of “lurking” writes that could be done on their behalf by a colluder.