A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fair exchange with a semi-trusted third party (extended abstract)
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Optimistic protocols for fair exchange
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Oblivious transfer and polynomial evaluation
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Enhancing privacy and trust in electronic communities
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Secure multi-party computation problems and their applications: a review and open problems
Proceedings of the 2001 workshop on New security paradigms
Notes on Data Base Operating Systems
Operating Systems, An Advanced Course
A Proposed Architecture for Trusted Third Party Services
Proceedings of the International Conference on Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms
Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Some constraints and tradeoffs in the design of network communications
SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Information sharing across private databases
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On honesty in sovereign information sharing
EDBT'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Advances in Database Technology
Privacy-preserving set operations
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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A secure calculation of common data R ∩S without disclosing R or S is useful for many applications and has been widely studied. However, proposed solutions assume all participants act “semi-honest”, which means participants may neither stop the protocol execution nor fake database content. In this contribution, we focus on a malicious participant behavior and prove that an atomic exchange of common data is not possible under the assumption of malicious participants. However, we propose mechanisms that not only reduce the damage in case a participant alters the exchange protocol, but also give a means to impede database content faking.