Security properties of two authenticated conference key agreement protocols

Authors:
Qiang Tang;Chris J. Mitchell
Affiliations:
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK;Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK
Venue:
ICICS'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In this paper we analyse the security of two authenticated group key agreement schemes based on the group key agreement protocol of Burmester and Desmedt. One scheme was proposed by Burmester and Desmedt, and uses a separate authentication scheme to achieve authentication among the participants. We show that this scheme suffers from a number of security vulnerabilities. The other scheme was generated using the general protocol compiler of Katz and Yung. We show that in some circumstances, even if key confirmation is implemented, this scheme still suffers from insider attacks (which are not covered by the security model used by Katz and Yung).