Market-based allocation with indivisible bids

Authors:
L. Julian Schvartzman;Michael P. Wellman
Affiliations:
Computer Science & Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI;Computer Science & Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Venue:
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We study multi-unit double auctions accepting bids with indivisibility constraints. We propose different price-quote policies and study their influence on the efficiency of market-based allocation. Using a reconfigurable manufacturing scenario where agents trade large quantities of multiple goods, we demonstrate potential benefits of supporting indivisibility constraints in bidding. These benefits are highly sensitive to the form of price quote provided, indicating interesting tradeoffs in communication and allocation efficiency.