ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Security Protocols
Binding Bit Patterns to Real World Entities
Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Security Protocols
The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-hoc Wireless Networks
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Telling humans and computers apart automatically
Communications of the ACM - Information cities
Security for whom? the shifting security assumptions of pervasive computing
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
CAPTCHA: using hard AI problems for security
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Decentralized trust management
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
Secure sessions from weak secrets
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Security Protocols
Key agreement in ad hoc networks
Computer Communications
Multi-channel key agreement using encrypted public key exchange
Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Security protocols
Trustworthiness and authentication in ubiquitous computing
Proceedings of the 10th ACM international symposium on Mobility management and wireless access
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Authentication is traditionally required to be strong enough to distinguish legitimate entities from unauthorised entities, and always involves some form of proof of identity, directly or indirectly. Conventional storable or delegable authentication scenarios in the pervasive computing environment are often frustrated by the qualitative changes of pervasive computing when humans are admitted into the loop. In this paper, we present an alternative approach based upon involving human self-determination in security protocols. This targets the authentication problem in pervasive computing, particularly when communication occurs in mobile ad-hoc fashion. We propose the argument of “thinkable” authentication, which involves using two-level protocols with the consideration of minimising trustworthiness in both human and computer device domains, but without unnecessary entity identity authentication. Thus, self-determining knowledge of the human interactions in pervasive computing can be exploited in order to make improvements on current security mechanisms.