STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Multi party computations: past and present
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Statistical Zero Knowledge Protocols to Prove Modular Polynomial Relations
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Statistically-Hiding Integer Commitment Scheme Based on Groups with Hidden Order
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
FC '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Sharing Decryption in the Context of Voting or Lotteries
FC '00 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
PKC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A Practical and Provably Secure Coalition-Resistant Group Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
A robust and verifiable cryptographically secure election scheme
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On monotone formula closure of SZK
SFCS '94 Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
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Perfect (or “first degree”) Price Discrimination is a standard economic practice that is used to increase the pricing effectiveness over a diverse population of prospective buyers. It is done by selling to different buyers at different prices based on their respective willingness to pay. While the strategy achieves Pareto efficiency, there are a number of problems in realizing and giving incentive to buyers to participate (and stay) in a market with price discrimination. This is especially true in an open process (like Internet commerce), where parties may learn about their price's individual standing (within the group of buyers) and may withdraw due to being relatively “over-charged” or may “resell” due to getting the goods at a relatively low price. We investigate the difficulties of realizing perfect price discrimination markets when full information is available to the participants even under the assumption of using standard cryptographic techniques. We then propose a “fair solution” for price discrimination in e-markets: using efficient cryptographic protocols (much more efficient than secure function evaluation protocols) we give incentives to users to stay in a market that utilizes price discrimination. Our protocols assure that the seller obtains the total revenue it expects and no buyer learns the price of other buyers. In addition, each buyer gets a “fair” discount off the surplus (the accumulated suggested payments by buyers minus the seller's expected revenue) when applicable and the seller may get part of the surplus as well. Further, the seller gets to learn the market “willingness to pay” (for potential future use), while this knowledge does not affect the pricing of the current e-market instance. Along the way we investigate the cryptographic primitive of “robust distributed summation” that may be of independent interest as a protocol construction.