Related-key attacks on the full-round cobra-f64a and cobra-f64b

  • Authors:
  • Jiqiang Lu;Changhoon Lee;Jongsung Kim

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK;Center for Information Security Technologies(CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea;ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium

  • Venue:
  • SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, designed for firmware-oriented applications, are 64-bit Data-dependent Permutation based block ciphers with 128 key bits, which consist of 16 and 20 rounds, respectively. In this paper, we investigate their security against related-key attacks. Our investigation shows that the full 16-round Cobra-F64a can be broken by our related-key rectangle attack and that the full 20-round Cobra-F64b can be broken by our related-key differential attack.