Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
A "Paradoxical" Indentity-Based Signature Scheme Resulting from Zero-Knowledge
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Proofs of Partial Knowledge and Simplified Design of Witness Hiding Protocols
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
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Proceedings of the 13th international World Wide Web conference on Alternate track papers & posters
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Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Spamming, phishing, authentication, and privacy
Communications of the ACM - The Blogosphere
Domain-based administration of identity-based cryptosystems for secure email and IPSEC
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Email-Based Identification and Authentication: An Alternative to PKI?
IEEE Security and Privacy
Designated verifier proofs and their applications
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Modeling and preventing phishing attacks
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Controlling spam by secure internet content selection
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
Phish and HIPs: human interactive proofs to detect phishing attacks
HIP'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Human Interactive Proofs
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Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An Identity-Based Key Agreement Protocol for the Network Layer
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Practical Short Signature Batch Verification
CT-RSA '09 Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2009 on Topics in Cryptology
TrueIP: prevention of IP spoofing attacks using identity-based cryptography
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Security of information and networks
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We present Lightweight Email Signatures (LES), a simple cryptographic architecture for authenticating email. LES is an extension of DKIM, the recent IETF effort to standardize domain-based email signatures. LES shares DKIM's ease of deployment: they both use the DNS to distribute a single public key for each domain. Importantly, LES supports common uses of email that DKIM jeopardizes: multiple email personalities, firewalled ISPs, incoming-only email forwarding services, and other common uses that often require sending email via a third-party SMTP server. In addition, LES does not require DKIM's implied intra-domain mechanism for authenticating users when they send email. LES provides these features using identity-based signatures. Each domain authority generates a master keypair, publishes the public component in the DNS, and stores the private component securely. Using this private component, the authority delivers to each of its users, via email, an individual secret key whose identity string corresponds to the user's email address. A sender then signs messages using this individual secret key. A recipient verifies such a signature by querying the appropriate master public key from the DNS, computing the sender's public key, and verifying the signature accordingly. As an added bonus, the widespread availability of user-level public keys enables deniable authentication, such as ring signatures. Thus, LES provides email authentication with optional repudiability. We built a LES prototype to determine its practicality. Basic user tests show that the system is relatively easy to use, and that cryptographic performance, even when using deniable authentication, is well within acceptable range.