Public quadratic polynomial-tuples for efficient signature-verification and message-encryption
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Algebraic Methods for Constructing Asymmetric Cryptosystems
AAECC-3 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
Cryptoanalysis of the Matsumoto and Imai Public Key Scheme of Eurocrypt'88
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the Oil & Vinegar Signature Scheme
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the TTM Cryptosystem
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Authentication Based on a Linear Algebra Problem MinRank
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A Fast and Secure Implementation of Sflash
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Unbalanced oil and vinegar signature schemes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Rainbow, a new multivariable polynomial signature scheme
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Efficient cryptanalysis of RSE(2)PKC and RSSE(2)PKC
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
A study of the security of unbalanced oil and vinegar signature schemes
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Practical-Sized Instances of Multivariate PKCs: Rainbow, TTS, and lIC-Derivatives
PQCrypto '08 Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography
Efficient implementations of multivariate quadratic systems
SAC'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
New differential-algebraic attacks and reparametrization of rainbow
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Selecting parameters for the rainbow signature scheme
PQCrypto'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
Roots of square: cryptanalysis of double-layer square and square+
PQCrypto'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
PQCrypto'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography
Reducing the key size of rainbow using non-commutative rings
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of enhanced TTS, STS and all its variants, or: why cross-terms are important
AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
Quo vadis quaternion? cryptanalysis of rainbow over non-commutative rings
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Performance analysis of multivariate cryptosystem schemes for wireless sensor network
Computers and Electrical Engineering
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Rainbow is a fast asymmetric multivariate signature algorithm proposed by J. Ding and D. Schmidt in [5]. This paper presents a cryptanalysis of Rainbow which enables an attacker provided with the public key to recover an equivalent representation of the secret key, thus allowing her to efficiently forge a signature of any message. For the set of parameter values recommended by the authors of Rainbow in order to achieve a security level strictly higher than 280, the complexity of our attack is less than 271 operations. This is 240 times less than the complexity of the best known attack used by the authors to dimension their system.