Comparing mark-and sweep and stop-and-copy garbage collection
LFP '90 Proceedings of the 1990 ACM conference on LISP and functional programming
Design principles and patterns for computer systems that are simultaneously secure and usable
Design principles and patterns for computer systems that are simultaneously secure and usable
Secure data deletion for Linux file systems
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Understanding data lifetime via whole system simulation
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Secure deletion of data from magnetic and solid-state memory
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Steganographic information hiding that exploits a novel file system vulnerability
International Journal of Security and Networks
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Many of today's privacy-preserving tools create a big file that fills up a hard drive or USB storage device in an effort to overwrite all of the “deleted files” that the media contain. But while this technique is widespread, it is largely unvalidated. We evaluate the effectiveness of the “big file technique” using sector-by-sector disk imaging on file systems running under Windows, Mac OS, Linux, and FreeBSD. We find the big file is effective in overwriting file data on FAT32, NTFS, and HFS, but not on Ext2fs, Ext3fs, or Reiserfs. In one case, a total of 248 individual files consisting of 1.75MB of disk space could be recovered in their entirety. Also, file metadata such as filenames are rarely overwritten. We present a theoretical analysis of the file sanitization problem and evaluate the effectiveness of a commercial implementation that implements an improved strategy.