Fast Digital Identity Revocation (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On Certificate Revocation and Validation
FC '98 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Replication is not needed: single database, computationally-private information retrieval
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secrecy, authentication, and public key systems.
Secrecy, authentication, and public key systems.
Computationally private information retrieval with polylogarithmic communication
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Certificate revocation and certificate update
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Privacy-preserving revocation checking with modified CRLs
EuroPKI'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Public Key Infrastructure: theory and practice
PPREM: Privacy Preserving REvocation Mechanism for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Computer Standards & Interfaces
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Digital certificates signed by trusted certification authorities (CAs) are used for multiple purposes, most commonly for secure binding of public keys to names and other attributes of their owners. Although a certificate usually includes an expiration time, it is not uncommon that a certificate needs to be revoked prematurely. For this reason, whenever a client (user or program) needs to assert the validity of another party's certificate, it performs revocation checking. There are many revocation techniques varying in both the operational model and underlying data structures. One common feature is that a client typically contacts an on-line third party (trusted, untrusted or semi-trusted), identifies the certificate of interest and obtains some form of a proof of either revocation or validity (non-revocation) for the certificate in question. While useful, revocation checking can leak potentially sensitive information. In particular, third parties of dubious trustworthiness discover two things: (1) the identity of the party posing the query, as well as (2) the target of the query. The former can be easily remedied with techniques such as onion routing or anonymous web browsing. Whereas, hiding the target of the query is not as obvious. Arguably, a more important loss of privacy results from the third party's ability to tie the source of the revocation check with the query's target. (Since, most likely, the two are about to communicate.) This paper is concerned with the problem of privacy in revocation checking and its contribution is two-fold: it identifies and explores the loss of privacy inherent in current revocation checking, and, it constructs a simple, efficient and flexible privacy-preserving component for one well-known revocation method.